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 Beyond Elitism: A Community Ideal for a Modern East Asia
 Sor-hoon Tan
 National University of Singapore
 It is often remarked that East Asian polities have been hierarchical and the "elite"
 category continues to figure prominently in works on Chinese society and politics.1
 Many scholars believe that hierarchy and elitism are deeply rooted in Confucianism,
 which served as the state orthodoxy in imperial China and provided the "psycho-
 cultural construct" of the way of life in other East Asian cultural communities as
 well. It is therefore not surprising that some should believe that if modern Confucian
 societies are to be democratic at all, elitism must be reconciled with democracy.
 In contrast, elitism is commonly a pejorative term in liberal democracies today,
 especially the United States, notwithstanding the portrayal of these polities by polit-
 ical scientists as cases of "democratic elitism."2 Presenting "democracy with Con-
 fucian characteristics" as elitism, therefore, highlights its challenge to liberal forms
 of democracy. Taking elitism seriously, Daniel A. Bell, in his Beyond Liberal
 Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context, offers us an institutional ar-
 rangement that combines what he sees as an elitist Confucian rule of virtue with a
 transparent and accountable democratic government that would check abuses of
 power.
 1 shall first consider in what way Bell's proposal is an alternative to liberal de-
 mocracy, and then explore theories of elitism for a better understanding of why elit-
 ism is usually seen to threaten or undermine democracy, whether liberal or other-
 wise. These two sets of theoretical explorations will provide the basis for evaluating
 whether Bell's proposal could realize the purposes and values of both Confucianism
 and democracy. I shall argue, contra Bell, that the community ideal of Confucian
 democracy, if it is to work in East Asia, would do better to eschew elitism for histor-
 ical as well as pragmatic reasons.
 Elitism as an Alternative to Liberalism: Is Democracy a Means or an End?
 The democratic value most directly threatened by elitism is not liberty but equality.
 Ironically, one view is that "just as elites inaugurated the age of equality, the age of
 equality brought forth elitism."3 Until equality came to be taken seriously as a value,
 the domination of societies by a select minority - that is, the existence and im-
 portance of elites - was taken for granted and did not need justification. Elitism as a
 political philosophy asserts that those who distinguish themselves by occupation or
 special knowledge or some other valued ability can make better decisions and
 should decide for the less able; it attempts to explain or justify elites and their roles
 in society.4 In doing so, elitists have only to deny a practical equality of competence
 between elites and other people; they can believe in fundamental or innate human
 equality, which has been associated with some classical liberal political philoso-
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 phies such as John Locke's. Despite this association between liberty and equality, in
 practice there is often a tension between these two values, so sometimes liberalism
 can be found on the side of elitism. Nineteenth-century classical liberals believed
 that the leadership of moral and intellectual, as well as technical, elites is required
 for any liberal order to flourish. More recently, sociologists G. Lowell Field and John
 Higley even have considered elitism an obligation for those who hold liberal values;
 they see nearly all features of modern liberal democracies as "instrumental liberal
 values which under certain circumstances may provide or promote ultimate liberal
 values/'5 They argue that the "failure of liberal thinking to understand the elitist
 character of legally and constitutionally established representative government was
 largely responsible for liberalism's failure to expand its effective influence in the
 world after 1 900."6
 Bell intends his Confucian institutional innovation to be an alternative to liberal-
 ism, but no less a liberal than John Stuart Mill declares:
 No government by a democracy or a numerous aristocracy, either in its political acts or in
 the opinions, qualities, and tone of mind which it fosters, ever did or could rise above
 mediocrity, except insofar as the sovereign Many have let themselves be guided (which
 in their best times they always have done) by the counsels and influence of a more highly
 gifted and instructed One or Few.7
 Bell would probably disagree with Mill that the democratic masses, even at their
 best, have followed or will follow the lead of the gifted few. They also part company
 when the liberal insists that all that the highly gifted and well instructed can claim "is
 freedom to point the way"8 and that they should not be organized or given institu-
 tional power, as Bell's proposed Xianshiyuan clearly is an institution organized to
 give elites political power. Will the institutional safeguards suggested by Bell enable
 this elitist institution to avoid corrupting its worthy occupants, despite the liberal be-
 lief that, unless it is to prevent harm to others, the power to coerce people, even
 when it is for their own good, always corrupts?
 John Skorupski describes Mill and other classical liberals as "moderate elitists."9
 Bell's recommended elitism fits what Skorupski calls "strong elitism," which orga-
 nizes the authority of the elite into a formal power that undermines the freedom of
 others. To Skorupski, elitism is opposed to populism rather than liberalism. Populism
 subscribes to two tenets: first, deliberation applies only to means but not to ends and
 values; second, the ends and values of all individuals deserve equal respect. More-
 over, the second tenet is derived from the first. Liberals also believe in equal respect
 for everyone's ends and values, but, according to Skorupski, this equal respect in
 classical liberalism "was derived from religious or metaphysical or at least regulative
 principles which are now difficult to sustain."10 Whereas classical liberals reject the
 first tenet, modernist liberalism has come to ground equality of respect as "ethical
 neutrality" on the "uncriticizability of ends."11 Insofar as current liberal "wisdom"
 effaces that crucial difference between classical liberalism and populism and adopts
 what Skorupski calls "Populist Values," Bell is justified in presenting his elitist Xian-
 shiyuan as an alternative to existing liberal democracy.
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 Others have contrasted elitism and populism in terms of attitudes toward the
 ability of elites to decide on behalf of the people versus the people's ability to
 make decisions about their lives: elitists are optimistic about the former while pop-
 ulists are optimistic about the latter.12 Elitists argue that the complexities of gov-
 ernment in today's world require knowledge and abilities that only a few experts
 possess and could never be acquired by the majority of people; therefore the task
 of government is best left in the hands of these experts, who belong to the elite.
 However, opponents could argue that the role of such experts is to serve the people,
 whose choices should determine the goals before experts can advise on how best to
 proceed. In other words, knowledge and expertise only matter in ensuring effective-
 ness and efficiency of means. To quote John Dewey, "the man who wears the shoe
 knows best that it pinches and where it pinches, even if the expert shoemaker is the
 best judge of how the trouble is to be remedied. "13
 Democracy can recognize the need for expertise in the different roles of elected
 representatives and career civil servants. We see this already in Mill's Representative
 Government, which tries to combine the benefits of "popular control" and "skilled
 legislation and administration" by separating the functions of government "by dis-
 joining the office of control and criticism from the actual conduct of affairs, and
 devolving the former on the representatives of the Many, while securing for the
 latter, under strict responsibility to the nation, the acquired knowledge and practiced
 intelligence of a specially trained and experienced Few."14 In liberal democracies,
 government bureaucracies can acquire the best expertise through meritocratic
 recruitment and promotion; this could be supplemented by ad hoc advice invited
 from relevant experts in various fields to remedy specific problems. However, de-
 mocracy requires that policies being considered should be made public, clearly
 explained in terms of their impact on the people and their relevance to the people's
 important concerns, and that the power to prioritize concerns and to choose the
 alternative policies available to deal with various issues ultimately belongs to the
 people, although their power may be delegated to elected representatives for spe-
 cific limited periods of time.
 If power is taken away from the people by a minority of experts, then democracy
 is replaced by technocracy, that is, expert elitism or merit-based elitism. The danger
 of this happening is greatest in a society lacking in the free and open circulation of
 information and public debates about matters affecting the people, which makes it
 difficult to hold even elected representatives accountable let alone career bureau-
 crats or experts. Insofar as liberalism is committed to such freedom and facilitates
 such openness, it safeguards against such elitism. Meritocracy may be more justifi-
 able than hereditary privilege or arbitrary power, but it needs to be kept in check by
 various measures to ensure accountability and prevent members of the elite from
 abusing their power.
 The argument above against expert elitism assumes that expertise does not apply
 to ends and values. This populist tenet, as mentioned earlier, supports optimism
 about a people's ability to choose for themselves. However, if ends and values
 require deliberation, and the people's ability to deliberate varies widely, then it
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 becomes more difficult to justify respecting everyone's choice and giving everyone
 equal freedom to choose, if good choice or the right choice matters. If only a select
 minority is able to choose wisely when it comes to ends and values, besides having
 the expertise to find the best means to these ends, then the best results would be
 achieved for all if these few are given the power to decide and act on everyone's
 behalf. Sometimes the question of who is best at choosing ends is evaded by assum-
 ing that it is obvious or that there is a clear consensus on which are the most impor-
 tant ends of good government-the top two choices being security and economic
 growth-so that the people need not be consulted, as the elite know best how to
 achieve these goals. It is clear that the elitism proposed by Bell is pessimistic about
 the people's ability to make good decisions in matters of government, whether these
 pertain to means or ends, and Bell believes that better results are achieved when
 such decisions are put in the hands of an elite selected through examinations similar
 to those used in East Asian societies with a Confucian heritage.
 Could we turn the antidemocratic argument for government expertise, offered
 as early as Plato's Protagoras, on its head by noting that the plausibility of a few indi-
 viduals having or acquiring the expertise to govern in a simple Greek polis dimin-
 ishes rapidly as society becomes more complex and arguably "ungovernable, unless
 the entire citizenry is activated to govern itself"?15 To cope with a more complex
 world, the elitist could increase the size of the elite, or even admit the existence of
 multiple elites (but with these still a minority of the polity), and argue that elitist gov-
 ernment would still work better than one involving the majority, let alone everyone.
 Friedrich Hayek, the liberal thinker who has become very influential in China,
 also subscribes to a kind of "ungovernability" thesis in his attacks on central plan-
 ning.16 This has led him, however, to criticize rather than support democracy, inso-
 far as democracy asserts the sovereignty of "the people." For Hayek, the advent
 of democracy rendered legitimate the claim of "unlimited sovereignty," which he
 identifies with absolutism. In claiming "sovereignty of the people," democracy "has
 inherited the tradition of absolutism" and made it worse.1 7 If by "activating the entire
 citizenry" to govern itself means giving "the people" the sovereign power to shape
 and control social life, then, to Hayek and his followers, democracy would be as
 inadequate as and probably more dangerous than authoritarian central planning.
 Hayek's ambivalence toward democracy is sometimes linked to elitism because he
 believes that "most things of value in the development of civilization were the work
 of minorities."18 Hayek may believe in the existence and importance of elites, but he
 is not an elitist in the sense of advocating that elites, because of their superiority, be
 given the power to decide for others how to live their lives.
 Hayek's ambiguity toward democracy is due at least in part to his view that
 "Democracy is essentially a means, a utilitarian device for safeguarding internal
 peace and individual freedom."19 This instrumental view of democracy is shared
 by elitist liberals as well as Bell's Confucian elitists. Bell understands democracy in
 the "minimal" sense as free and fair competitive elections under universal franchise
 to fill policy making positions (p. 185); as such it is simply an imperfect means of
 achieving good government. Liberals who have reservations about democracy usu-
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 ally are suspicious of its effect on liberty. Liberal elitism often arises from giving
 priority to liberty when confronted with the tension between liberty and equality.
 Confucians have different priorities. Instead of individual liberty, their chief goal of
 good government is to achieve a Confucian community of morally cultivated per-
 sons in harmonious relations. Insofar as Confucians believe that exemplary persons
 (junzi) and petty persons (xiaoren) would not make equally good decisions, whether
 choosing means or ends, they would support inequality of political power corre-
 sponding to inequality of moral merit. Confucians would prefer to put government
 in the hands of those who would govern virtuously, the moral elite of a society, in-
 stead of entrusting such an important task to those elected by people whose lack of
 virtue would lead to bad choices. The question remains: have Confucians really
 developed the institutional device (i.e., competitive examinations) that could identify
 such a "moral elite"? The successes of civil service examinations in Confucian soci-
 eties are patchy at best, and, if measured by the ideal of achieving a true Confucian
 order, have been no more successful than universal suffrage has been successful in
 producing true democracy.
 Elitism against Democracy
 Bell modifies what he understands to be Confucian elitism with a democratically
 elected lower house in his proposed bicameral legislature, and spends some time
 discussing the pros and cons of different balance-of-power schemes between the
 two. Bell's preference for a stronger Xianshiyuan - while acknowledging the histori-
 cal trends probably renders a relatively weak Xianshiyuan more feasible - is basi-
 cally a desire to rein in democracy with elitism in the belief that the latter will yield
 better results for government than the former. This is a common response to democ-
 racy throughout its history. Some founders of the American republic like Alexander
 Hamilton offered elitist arguments against democracy conceived as popular sover-
 eignty, based on the perceived tendency of the masses to make bad choices:
 All communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The first are rich and well-
 born, the other the masses of people
 seldom judge or determine right.20
 The difference between Bell and Hamilton lies in the characteristics of the elites they
 favored; Bell's Confucian elite is a meritocracy selected through competitive exami-
 nations and therefore does not necessarily draw its members from the rich and well-
 born, at least in theory.
 Instead of arguing that the elite should govern rather than the people, elitism was
 offered in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a social theory about how
 society is actually organized. Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), Gaetano Mosca (1858-
 1941), and Robert Michels (1876-1936) asserted the empirical thesis that power is
 concentrated in the hands of a few in all societies.21 They focused on how elites
 form and work, and were interested in how elites could function better, rather
 than whether they should or should not rule, which becomes a moot question.22
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 Notwithstanding the positivist stance of some theorists, such empirical theses have
 normative implications. At the very least, this changes the limits of possibility within
 which normative claims must lie. As Field and Higley point out, if there is no way
 to prevent elitism in societies of any complexity, then "all normative commitments
 to goal values such as freedom and equality must be tempered by this ineluctable
 aspect of complex social organization/'23 One sense in which we might take elitism
 seriously is to acknowledge that if power is inevitably concentrated in the hands of a
 select few, then any society is faced with a choice not between the presence and
 absence of elites, but only of different elites, whether and how their role might be
 transformed or enhanced to benefit rather than harm society. In that case, is not gov-
 ernment by virtuous and talented elites, such as Confucians seem to advocate, surely
 a better choice than elites of prominent families, of wealth, or of military might?
 Not everyone who asserts the empirical thesis of elitism recommends it as a val-
 uable norm. Marx maintained that an all-encompassing elite dominated capitalist
 societies, but viewed this as something to be changed by revolution. C. Wright Mills
 (1 91 6-1 962), in his study of American society, concluded that the economic, polit-
 ical, and military elites come together-albeit "only on certain coinciding points and
 only on certain occasions of 'crisis' "-to form the "power elite":24
 We must remember that these men of the power elite now occupy the strategic places in
 the structure of American Society; that they command the dominant institutions of a dom-
 inant nation; that, as a set of men, they are in a position to make decisions with terrible
 consequences for the underlying populations of the world.25
 The outcome of elite rule in America as Mills saw it clearly left much to be desired.
 While he might not favor elite rule over democratic government, Mills' pessimistic
 conclusion may be equally damning: democracy in the sense of government by the
 people is non-existent and probably impossible. Worse, liberals' support for democ-
 racy is based on a misconception of how the political process works, which perpet-
 uates the power elite's domination.26
 Others are less critical of elitism in American society and less pessimistic about
 democracy even given the fact of elitism. For some, democracy and elitism are al-
 ready reconciled in American society. Thomas Dye, the author of Who's Running
 America, talks without irony about "elitism in a democracy":
 Great power in America is concentrated in a handful of people. A few thousand individ-
 uals out of 250 million Americans decide about war and peace, wages and prices, con-
 sumption and investment, employment and production, law and justice, taxes and bene-
 fits, education and learning, health and welfare, advertising and communication, life and
 leisure. In all societies-primitive and advanced, totalitarian and democratic, capitalist
 and socialist-only a few people exercise great power. This is true whether or not such
 power is exercised in the name of "the people/'27
 Democracy simply means that elites exercise their power "in the name of the
 people."
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 A few decades earlier, Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) had already combined
 elitism with democracy in what came to be called democratic elitism, wherein elites
 through political parties compete for power via the ballot box. Capitalism, Socialism,
 and Democracy proposes a theory of democracy that is "much truer to life" by
 reversing the two elements in the classical theory of democracy, which treats the
 vesting of power in the people as primary and the selection of representatives as
 secondary. The democratic method is defined as "that institutional arrangement for
 arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by
 means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote/'28 Schumpeter was not inter-
 ested in a normative judgment of ruling elites; he followed Pareto in taking as elites
 the groups who could actually occupy positions of power, regardless of whether
 they deserve to do so, or whether society would be better off without them even if
 that were possible. Subsequent works on democratic elitism have tried to show that
 in liberal democracies the consensus among competing elites supports democratic
 values (focusing on attitudes to civil liberties), so that empirical elitism works in favor
 of the norms of democracy once a democratic system is in place.29 This has been
 challenged recently by some political scientists, using Canadian data, who criticize
 as a fallacy democratic elitism's indifference to which elites prevail in the electoral
 competition for power, because elites differ among themselves in their attitudes to-
 ward civil liberties sometimes more significantly than they differ from the masses.30
 Democratic elitism notwithstanding, some who take seriously "government of
 the people, by the people, for the people" will view combinations of democracy
 and elitism as rendering democracy a sham. Even purportedly empirical elitism
 threatens democratic values. Field and Higley believe that acceptance of the "elitist
 paradigm" requires refutation of "the widely held assumption that values such as
 equality, liberty and freedom are universal and objective."31 Sometimes the norma-
 tive political philosophy or ideology could be disguised as empirical statements; the
 authors of The Bell Curve have been accused of advancing the New Right's political
 agenda in an assault on equality deceivingly presented as an empirical study of
 innate inequality.32 The claim of elitism that only a few are fit to rule or are capable
 of achieving the best results in governing implies that power should be limited to
 these few. This means the opposite of democracy with its demand for equal access
 to power and position, and for accountability by decision makers to those affected
 by their decisions. Selection by examination may be open to all, but this will not
 be sufficient to ensure equality of opportunity because, talent and virtue aside, there
 may be sociopolitical factors that create differences in ability to take advantage of a
 given opportunity. Empirical studies have shown that elites tend to recruit their
 members mainly from certain narrow social strata, thus precluding "government of
 the people." Elites are often autonomous and not accountable to the people for their
 decisions, and this undermines government by the people. Elites are an internally
 homogeneous group, unified and conscious of their special identity, and thus able
 to perpetuate their position of privilege at the expense of others, especially the
 masses.
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 Confucian Democracy: Going beyond Elitism
 Part of the problem with Bell's compromise solution is its focus on methods at the
 expense of goals. To some extent this is understandable if the objective is to offer a
 practical solution and if the goals are clear; but if the goals are unclear, misunder-
 stood, or misrepresented, then emphasizing the methods of achieving them is hardly
 useful. I also suspect that Bell might have overlooked some of the consequences of
 applying his methods that might undermine both democratic and Confucian goals.
 His "combination" approach to forming a government, involving democratic elec-
 tions and competitive examinations, is based on an assumed compatibility of Con-
 fucian and democratic values. I share the assumption about this compatibility, but
 disagree with Bell's identifying "popular participation, accountability, and transpar-
 ency" as democratic values; to me these are features of democratic institutions that
 reflect or aim at the values of community, equality, and liberty.33 Confucian democ-
 racy is a worthy ideal for East Asia only if it includes all these values - not if it means
 only improving the method of filling policy-making positions by means of "free and
 fair competitive elections under universal franchise" (the "minimal" sense of democ-
 racy adopted by Bell). Confucians would prefer a government by the virtuous and
 the talented, but does this mean that they are elitist in the sense of believing simply
 that such elites should make decisions for the people, even against their wishes?
 While I agree that the democratization of East Asian societies cannot ignore their
 Confucian legacy, a focus on elitism is misguided because it is likely to revive the
 more reprehensible aspects of Confucian political philosophy and the historical
 practice, often mistaken for Confucianism, that resulted from politicians distorting
 Confucianism through their appropriation of it as ideology.
 While the imperial civil service examination may have had its admirable
 aspects, we should also learn from its failures. These are not just a matter of imper-
 fect execution, such as making too many exceptions to the meritocratic principle or
 choosing the wrong curricula or having inadequate assessment criteria. Did Confu-
 cius judge his students by their examination results? Did he not do so merely be-
 cause he was too "primitive" a teacher to use that method or too wise to need it? I
 would rather think that the kind of virtues (including wisdom) with which Confucius
 was concerned cannot be tested or assessed through competitive examinations,
 however well designed. To delude ourselves into thinking otherwise would be dan-
 gerous as it would allow "elites" selected in this way to make unjustified claims and
 foster unwarranted expectations of them.
 Moreover, it is not at all clear that we can expand the Confucian notion of
 wisdom to include the kind of "expert knowledge" that we must admit is required
 to govern increasingly complex modern states in an increasingly difficult inter-
 national environment, and to manage the new "knowledge economy." While one
 need not adopt the dismissive attitudes that Confucius and later Confucians have
 expressed toward "technical" knowledge - what in Neo-Confucian jargon is yong
 (use or technique) versus ti (substance, sometimes referring to values) - one should
 take seriously the likelihood that knowledge in the sense of expertise diverges from
 544 Philosophy East & West
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 wisdom in the Confucian sense, or any other sense of the virtuous or moral. One
 might use "talent" (cai) to encompass the expert knowledge or ability required for
 modern government, but the coupling of virtue or moral worthiness (xian) with talent
 (cai) may be too facile and needs to be questioned. Indeed, one could criticize Con-
 fucian political philosophy for its failure to take this division seriously; it either
 assumes that virtue always goes with knowledge or underestimates the importance
 of knowledge for good government. Even if it is plausible that a virtuous person in
 Confucius' times was likely to have little trouble mastering the tasks of government,
 given the relative simplicity of life and the problems facing that society (or so we
 think), it seems laughable to suggest the same thing today. Unless Confucianism
 faces this problem squarely, its political practice will continue to fail by naively mis-
 taking the expert for the virtuous, or unrealistically expecting the virtuous to be
 expert enough for anything and everything.
 Crime, corruption, and unethical behavior in high places - in politics, in the cor-
 porate world, and even in academia - constantly remind us ofthat schism between
 knowledge (and the ability that comes with knowledge) and virtue. Even if we could
 agree with Bell on the ideal traits of "political decision makers in contemporary soci-
 eties" - that they should be "intelligent, adaptable, long-term minded, and public
 spirited" - and that these are "not all that different from the traditional virtues of
 Confucian exemplary persons" (p. Ί60), what reason do we have to assume that
 these traits would be combined in every individual member and that one could as-
 sess all these traits by means of examinations? Selected by competitive examina-
 tions, the "upper" house in Bell's proposed system may be more talented or capable,
 but there is no reason to believe that they would therefore be more virtuous than the
 members of the lower house. It is dangerous to call the upper house a "Confucian
 elite" because this misrepresents the character of their legitimacy, and misleads us
 into thinking that they would necessarily be virtuous or even "public spirited,"
 when they may be as likely as the members of the lower house to allow personal
 interests and affiliations to influence their decisions.
 It is not so much the lack of ability of despotic rulers as their lack of morality, in
 particular their exploitative selfishness, that makes democracy an attractive alterna-
 tive. After all, the charge against tyranny is that "absolute power corrupts abso-
 lutely," not that it renders one absolutely incompetent or ineffective. If transferring
 sovereign power to the people is believed to be a more effective form of govern-
 ment, it is only because once it is accepted that a government should be a govern-
 ment for the people, and that rulers cannot be trusted not to abuse their power for
 their own selfish gain at the expense of the people, then government by the people
 is the best if not the only way to ensure a government that is for the people. What
 remains, then, is to build the most effective institutions possible, however imperfect
 and in need of constant improvement, to approximate government by the people.
 I agree that democratic institutions are always subject to improvement. I am also
 in favor of adapting democratic institutions to the needs of Confucian, in particular
 East Asian, societies. However, I do not believe that this can be done by setting Con-
 fucian elitism above democracy; elitism is the enemy of democracy. For a supporter
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 of Confucian democracy to take elitism seriously means to exclude elitism alto-
 gether. Historically, the rule by elites in China that was associated with Confucian-
 ism (or rather Confucian ideology) paid little attention to the values of liberty and
 equality and as a consequence was often oppressive. It was the claim by the elites
 and various individuals in positions of power, whether they were officials, village
 elders, fathers, husbands, or anyone else, that they knew better than others what
 was good for everyone and therefore were justified in making decisions for others,
 that resulted in so much injustice and tyranny, which finally broke the back of Con-
 fucian ideology amidst the May Fourth cries of "Down with the Confucian Shop!"
 It is vital to the project of reconciling Confucianism and democracy to distin-
 guish between (1) elitist thinking and (2) the Confucian respect for the virtuous and
 talented (xian-cai) and the sense of responsibility of virtuous and talented Confu-
 cians, which could be put to good use in democratic politics. While I no longer
 call myself a liberal these days, at least not without a great deal of laborious qualifi-
 cations, given the greater weight I give to community relative to some liberals, I
 agree with John Stuart Mill that we should draw the line at allowing "elites" to
 coerce others.34 Being limited to "freedom to point the way" should not frustrate a
 virtuous Confucian, even if it leads to substandard results in some specific cases, be-
 cause Confucius himself teaches that the rule of virtue is about setting the best exam-
 ple {Analects 2.1, 12.19, 13.2). Since Confucians are not simply interested in social
 control, but aim for the kind of spontaneous harmonious order where self-cultivation
 is of central importance, to coerce others for good results would be as self-defeating
 as Mencius' example of the man from Song who pulled on sprouts to aid their
 growth and killed them instead (2A2). Confucian government by virtue should not
 need to resort to violence or coercion; if the virtuous example is ignored, then this
 means that virtue is still in insufficient supply, and the virtuous should continue to
 strive toward improvement through self-cultivation rather than resort to naked power
 to make up for their personal inadequacy. This may sound overly idealistic to the
 political scientist, and so it may be, but the function of a social ideal is to set a high
 standard for practice so that it could guide improvement to the status quo. While
 imperfect reality may make coercion necessary in government, as Confucius recog-
 nized that the necessary evil of laws and punishments were needed, its use pre-
 cludes the title of "elite" in any Confucian sense.
 According to some of the aforementioned studies on democratic elitism, demo-
 cratic elites uphold democratic values, including that of equality. The valuing of
 equality in a democracy does not mean that "one-size fits all," but rather is a matter
 of resisting unjustified inequalities while allowing for differences compatible with a
 government of the people, by the people, and for the people. Therefore, in a democ-
 racy, elites need not be a threat to reasonable egalitarian values if the elite institution
 is functional and meritocratic rather than privileged, and if it draws its members from
 all strata of society.35 In contrast, where there is a lack of accountability to the peo-
 ple, undemocratic societies are mostly likely to be ruled by elites who are exploit-
 ative, self-interested, and self-perpetuating at society's expense.36 This kind of elitist
 inequality is undemocratic. Historically, this situation has existed in China even
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 when it claimed to be practicing Confucian values. Thus, until democratic values are
 firmly rooted in East Asian societies, to exalt "Confucian elitism" is to risk legitimat-
 ing undemocratic elites. This would be true of Bell's proposal, with its elites selected
 by competitive examinations, even though it would be Bell's intention to guard
 against an undemocratic elitism as a distortion of the Confucian ideal.
 It is important to Confucian democracy to uphold the value of equality, not only
 because it has had a history of being trampled on in China during the imperial
 period, but also because the Confucian social ideal is so often mistaken as inherently
 hierarchical. Its inequality has been justified as "unequal treatment of unequals"
 which is just equality and part of its "meritocracy/'37 However, until it can be
 ensured that there will be a level playing field, a partial implementation of the "mer-
 itocratic" principle would only result in the entrenching of initial inequalities inher-
 ited from earlier, unjust systems. The tendency of even "meritocratically" promoted
 elites to favor their own kin would have the result of perpetuating themselves at
 others' expense; this could occur even within the limits of Confucian understanding
 of legitimate partiality. Is it not appropriate for me to first send my child to college
 before helping other, more deserving children who could not afford to go to college?
 Or should I donate my child's college allowance to scholarships for those more de-
 serving students?38 And there are other reasons for qualifying any description of the
 Confucian social ideal as meritocratic. There is ample evidence in the early Confu-
 cian texts of a conception of distributive justice based on needs over deserved
 rewards based on merit. Both Confucius and Mencius maintain that the government
 should first take care of the worst off in society even though they are likely to con-
 tribute the least to society.39
 While he might not have argued explicitly for equality, Confucius was definitely
 concerned about disparities between the rich and the poor; he considered "uneven
 distribution" a more serious problem than poverty in a state (Analects 16.1). "Exem-
 plary persons help out the needy; they do not make the rich richer" (Analects 6.4).
 Those who are powerful and of high rank should be satisfied with the same of what
 is available to those at the bottom of the social strata; they should not expect to be
 better off (Analects 12.9). Mencius insisted that rulers should share their "joys" with
 the people (1 A1, 1 B1), an ideal that could form the basis of an egalitarian principle
 of distribution in a Confucian democracy. Even the Xunzi, usually seen as advocat-
 ing a hierarchical social order, recognized the subversive effect of a wide disparity
 between rich and poor even in autocratic regimes:
 Accordingly, the True King enriches the people; the lord-protector enriches his scholar-
 knights; a state that barely manages to survive enriches its grand officers; and a state that
 is doomed enriches only the ruler's coffers and fills up his storehouses.40
 Although there is no reason why the establishment of Bell's Xianshiyuan, with the
 limits he imposes on the institution, should directly increase inequality or give rise
 to self-perpetuating exploitation by elites, it is preferable not to present the proposal
 as a form of "elitism," given elitism's long-standing threat to equality.
 Even though the ideal Confucian community that is revealed in the early texts
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 could be seen as hierarchical, I have argued that the inherent inequalities could be
 understood to mean that a Confucian community today should have functional dif-
 ferentiation rather than rigid hierarchy. The texts' repeated emphasis on the im-
 portance of "promoting the worthy and capable" (ju-xian-cai) is testament to the
 conviction that Confucian elitism must be functional and meritocratic, rather than
 closed and privileged. Based on Confucius' egalitarian attitude in accepting students
 (Analects 15.39, 7.7), Confucian elites should also draw their members from all
 social levels and groups. While it may not have been an issue in Confucius' time,
 the need for complex and diverse abilities to carry out the tasks of the government
 of today as well as in other areas of life means that any judgment as to superiority or
 inferiority must be specific to a situation and does not yield a totalistic ranking in a
 simple "roster" of best to worst. This points to a differentiated order that is very dif-
 ferent from a rigid hierarchy in which one's position is determined once and for all.
 A superior accountant may be an inferior manager, and a person's excellence in a
 field vis-à-vis others may change over time.41 This means that the membership of
 the elite changes over time; there is no "life-time membership," and being good or
 even "the best" in a particular area does not make one "elite" without qualification.
 When the term "elite" ceases to refer to any specific coherent group exercising
 power over the rest of society, it becomes difficult to take elitism seriously in politics.
 Instead of having a bicameral legislature with an upper house whose member-
 ship is limited to seven years, it might be better to have a range of institutions, each
 comprising members who are "worthy and capable" within specific subject areas
 and whose decision-making power is of limited scope. The selection process should
 not depend solely on "competitive examinations" but include other appropriate
 means of assessing the abilities or qualities of the candidates. This "differentiated"
 approach to countering the inadequacy of elected representatives takes better ac-
 count of the diversity of decision-making abilities needed in different policy areas
 as well the limitations of individuals, where no one person could possibly make
 good decisions on every policy issue. The matters to be decided by such institutions
 should be those that are either "choice insensitive," or where the chances of people
 making the right choices are especially slim and the harm that would be done by the
 wrong choices would be especially great.42 Such institutions already do exist in
 many liberal democracies, where their function is to limit the power of the majority
 in matters often involving basic rights. Confucian societies could choose different
 areas for this kind of "protection," and the institutions would function less as "legal
 restraints" and more as "conscientious stewards." In the spirit of Confucian concern
 for individual moral cultivation and communal harmony, the public would have
 open access to the deliberations of such institutions and the reasons for their deci-
 sions would be publicized, not only to make them accessible to critical appraisal
 but also to educate the general population.
 The foregoing proposal is only a rough sketch intended as a first step to a better
 alternative to elitism if we are to take seriously the Confucian belief that both virtue
 and talent have a rightful place in a Confucian democracy.
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 Notes
 1 - Some recent examples from a substantial literature include: Joseph Fewsmith,
 Elite Politics in Contemporary China (Armonk, NY: Μ. Ε. Sharpe, 2001); Xiao-
 wei Zang, Elite Dualism and Leadership Selection in China (New York: Rout-
 ledgeCurzon, 2004); Zheng Yongnian, Will China become Democratic? Elite,
 Class and Regime Transition (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2004); Victor
 C. Shih, Factions and Finance in China: Elite Conflict and Inflation (New York:
 Cambridge University Press, 2008).
 2 - Recent studies of elitism lament that "political correctness" often stands in the
 way of inquiry and objective assessment (Eric Carlton, The Few and the Many
 [Aldershot: Ashgate, 1996], p. 2). According to one defender of Elitism, a "cul-
 ture critic" for Time Magazine, the term "elitist" has come to rival if not to out-
 strip "racist" as the foremost catchall pejorative of 1 990s America; see William
 A. Henry III, In Defense of Elitism (New York: Doubleday, 1994), p. 2. Henry's
 "defense," based almost entirely on anecdotal sources, some of which are big-
 oted and ignorant, is a highly polemical attack on American egalitarianism,
 which, according the author, is exemplified by the special demands of minor-
 ities, feminists, and homosexuals, at the expense of reason and standards in
 the educational, economic, social, and cultural domains. See a review essay
 on this book by Morton P. Levitt, "The Offense of Elitism," Journal of Modern
 Literature 24 (3/4) (2001): 534-538.
 3 - Jeffrey Bell, Populism and Elitism: Politics in the Age of Equality (Washington,
 D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1992), p. 57.
 4 - Ibid., p. 59.
 5 - G. Lowell Field and John Higley, Elitism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
 1980), p. 58.
 6 - Ibid., p. 50.
 7 -John Stuart Mill, On Liberty in Collected Works, ed. J. M. Robson (London:
 Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), vol. 18, p. 269.
 8 - Ibid.
 9 -John Skorupski, "Liberal Elitism," in David Milligan and William Watts Miller,
 eds., Liberalism, Citizenship, and Autonomy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1992), pp.
 134-153, 136.
 10 -Ibid., p. 135.
 1 1 - Ibid., p. 136. By "modernist," Skorupski means that which pertains to the cul-
 tural phase of the first half of the twentieth century (Skorupski, "Liberal Elitism,"
 p. 146). Skorupski himself defends the possibility of deliberation about ends
 and values by grounding the discussion in a naturalist and historical concep-
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 tion of rationality and objectivity (pp. 147-150). For an account of the politics
 and 'Values crisis'' in post-World War II America that contributed to this trans-
 formation of liberal doctrine, see Bell, Populism and Elitism, chap. 12.
 12 - Jeffrey Bell, Populism and Elitism, p. 3.
 13 -John Dewey, The Public and its Problems, first published in 1927, in Jo Ann
 Boydston, ed., John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953 (Carbondale: South-
 ern Illinois University Press, 1988), vol. 2, p. 364. See also David Spitz, Patterns
 of Anti-democratic Thought (New York: Free Press, 1965), pp. 148-149.
 14 - John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government (New
 York: Dutton, 1950), p. 323; quoted in Willmoore Kendall and George W.
 Carey, "The 'Roster Device': J. S. Mill and Contemporary Elitism," The Western
 Political Quarterly 21 (1) (1968): 20-39, at p. 27. While resisting the conclu-
 sion that Mill is an elitist, Kendall and Carey show that Representative Govern-
 ment displays the mindset that permeates contemporary elitist thinking.
 1 5 - Jeffrey Bell, Populism and Elitism, p. 68.
 1 6 - Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
 1976). On the relation of Hayek's "ungovernability" thesis and his uncertainty
 about democracy, see Chandran Kukathas, "Friedrich Hayek: Elitism and De-
 mocracy," in Liberal Democracy and its Critics, ed. April Carter and Geoffrey
 Stokes (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), pp. 21-38, at p. 34.
 17 - Ibid., p. 36; Friedrich Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty (London: Routledge
 and Kegan Paul, 1982), vol. 3, pp. 34-35.
 18 - Andrew Gamble, Hayek: The Iron Cage of Liberty (Boulder, CO: Westview,
 1996), p. 97. Chandran Kukathas ("Friedrich Hayek: Elitism and Democracy")
 disagrees with this reading of Hayek as an elitist.
 19 - Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. 52; quoted in Kukathas, "Friedrich Hayek:
 Elitism and Democracy," p. 23.
 20 - Speech by Alexander Hamilton in 1787, Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the
 Federal Convention of 1787, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), vol. 1,
 p. 299.
 21 - Sample works include: Vilfredo Pareto, The Governing Class in History (Albu-
 querque, NM: American Classical College Press, 1986); Vilfredo Pareto, The
 Rise and Fall of the Elites: An Application of Theoretical Sociology, introd.
 Hans L. Zetterberg (Totowa, NJ: Bedminster Press, 1968) - a translation of Un
 applicazione di teorie sociologiche, in Revista Italiana di sociologia (1901):
 402-456; Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, Elementi de scienze política
 (1939), trans, by Hannah D. Kahn, ed. and rev. with an introd. by Arthur
 Livingston (New York and London: McGraw-Hill, 1968); Robert Michels, Po-
 litical Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern
 Democracy, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (Glencoe: Free Press, 1949); C. Wright
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 Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956). Anthony
 Birch argues that none of the theories of these authors offers a serious intel-
 lectual challenge to democratic theory; Birch takes more seriously the Marxist
 and neo-Marxist critique that democracy is only elitism disguised, but even-
 tually dismisses this for lack of evidence that the state is always a tool of the
 capitalist class and does not serve the people (Anthony H. Birch, The Con-
 cepts and Theories of Modern Democracy [London: Routledge, 1993], pp.
 169-195).
 22 - More recent works on elites also often premise their studies on similar observa-
 tions. For example: 'Insofar as all societies require rules and general recogni-
 tion and observance of such rules and conventions, to that extent some kind of
 ruling elite seems inevitable" (Carlton, The Few and the Many, p. 1 9).
 23 - Field and Higley, Elitism, p. 72.
 24 - Mills, The Power Elite, p. 276.
 25 - Ibid., p. 286.
 26 - Ibid., p. 336. Beside Birch's critique of Mills (The Concepts and Theories of
 Modern Democracy, pp 1 82-1 85), for a defense of democracy in Dewey's phi-
 losophy against Mills' elitism, see James Campbell, Understanding John Dewey
 (La Salle: Open Court, 1995), pp. 235-265.
 27 - Thomas R. Dye, Who's Running America? The Clinton Years (Englewood Cliffs,
 NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995), p. 8. The first volume of the series Who's Running
 America? was published in 1976 and covered the Nixon-Ford years; sub-
 sequent volumes covered the Carter years (1979), the Reagan years (1983),
 the conservative years (1986), and the Bush era (1990). Contrary to the claim
 of a "power elite," Dye finds no convergence as far as the "interlocking" of
 institutional positions is concerned, even though 15 percent of those holding
 positions of power in the areas Dye examined held two or more positions and
 30 percent of the positions were interlocked with one another (p. 1 67). See also
 Henry, In Defense of Elitism, p. 20.
 28 - Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, rev. ed. (London:
 Allen and Unwin, 1947), p. 269.
 29 - Examples of such works are Samuel Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and
 Civil Liberties (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1955); Herbert McCloskey, "Con-
 sensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review
 58 (1964): 361-382; Thomas R. Dye and Herman Seigler, The Irony of Democ-
 racy, 7th ed. (Monterey: Brooks/Cole, 1987); Herbert McCloskey and Alida
 Brill, Dimensions of Tolerance: What Americans Think about Civil Liberties
 (New York: Russell Sage, 1983); David G. Barnum and John L. Sullivan, "Atti-
 tudinal Tolerance and Political Freedom in Britain," British Journal of Political
 Science 1 8 (1 988): 604-61 4.
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 30 - Paul M. Sniderman, Joseph F. Fletcher, Peter H. Russell, Philip E. Tetlock, and
 Brian J. Gaines, "The Fallacy of Democratic Elitism: Elite Competition and
 Commitment to Civil Liberties/' British Journal of Political Science 21 (3) (July
 1 99Ί ): 349-370. This view is expanded in a monograph by Paul M. Sniderman,
 Joseph F. Fletcher, Peter H. Russell, and Philip E. Tetlock, The Clash of Rights
 (New Haven: Yale University press, 1 996). For an earlier challenge to the "Elites
 Are More Democratic" thesis, see James L. Gibson, "Political Intolerance and
 Political Repression During the McCarthy Red Scare," American Political Sci-
 ence Review, 82 (Ί988): 511-530. See also the subsequent debate between
 Sniderman's team and the team of Vengroff and Morton, who claim that the
 elite differences highlighted by the earlier study reflect regional differences
 and do not challenge the democratic-elitist thesis of elite consensus. See Richard
 Vengroff and F. L. Morton, "Regional Perspectives on Canada's Charter Rights
 and Freedoms: A Re-Examination of Democratic Elitism," Canadian Journal of
 Political Science 33 (2) (June 2000): 359-382; Paul Sniderman, Joseph F.
 Fletcher, Peter H. Russell, Philip E. Tetlock, and Markus Prior, "The Theory of
 Democratic Elitism Revisited: A Response to Vengroff and Morton," Canadian
 Journal of Political Science 33 (3) (September 2000): 569-586; Richard Ven-
 groff and F. L. Morton, "The Theory of Democratic Elitism Revisited Again,"
 Canadian Journal of Political Science 34 (1) (March 2001): 169-173. Frank
 Bealy argues that it is not possible to generalize about the attitude of elites to
 democracy, in "Democratic Elitism and the Autonomy of Elites," International
 Political Science Review 1 7 (3) (1 996): 31 9-331 .
 31 - Field and Higley, Elitism, p. 3.
 32 - Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Bell Curve: Intelligence and
 Class Structure in American Life (New York: Free Press, 1 994); Peter Knapp
 et al., The Assault on Equality (Westport: Praeeer, 1996).
 33 - Cf. John Dewey's list of democratic values, "fraternity, liberty, and equality," in
 The Public and Its Problems, p. 329.
 34 - If I must pick a label for my position, it would be a "Deweyan social liberal"
 who believes that democracy is the "the idea of community life itself" and that
 "fraternity, liberty, and equality isolated from communal life are hopeless
 abstractions" (ibidv pp. 328, 329).
 35 - Carlton, The Few and the Many, p. 19. Carton also believed that egalitarians
 would want elites to be "prepared to give people what they want instead of
 what is thought to be good for them." I think this requirement would be
 rejected by elitism.
 36 - This understanding of elites and elitism informs studies of developing countries
 that tend to be critical of them.
 37 - For example, see A. T. Nuyen, "Confucianism and the Idea of Equality," Asian
 Philosophy 1 1 (2) (2001 ): 61 -71 .
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 38 - These problems of meritocracy are parodied in Michael Young, The Rise of the
 Meritocracy, 1870-2033: An Essay on Education and Equality (Baltimore: Pen-
 guin, 1958).
 39 - See Analects 6.4, where Confucius disapproves of the amount Ranyou gave to
 Zihua's mother, not because it is excessive relative to Zihua's merit, but be-
 cause Zihua was already well-to-do. Also see Mencius ΊΒ5, in D. C. Lau,
 trans., Mencius (Harmondsworth: Penguin, Ί970), p. 65; Joseph Chan, "Mak-
 ing Sense of Confucian Justice/' Forum for Intercultural Philosophy 3 (2001),
 http://them.polylog.Org/3/fcj-en.htm, 2.1-2.3.
 40 - Xunzi, "On the Regulations of a King," in John Knoblock, trans., Xunzi: A
 Translation and Study of the Complete Works (Stanford: Stanford University
 Press, 1990), vol. 2, p. 98.
 41 - For a more detailed discussion of the Confucian "differentiated order" and the
 value of equality in Confucian democracy, see Sor-hoon Tan, Confucian De-
 mocracy: A Deweyan Reconstruction (Albany: State University of New York
 Press, 2004), pp. 98-112.
 42 - Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory of Practice of Equality (Cam-
 bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 204. I am borrowing from
 Dworkin's distinction between choice-sensitive and choice-insensitive issues
 requiring collective action. The former are "those whose correct solution, as a
 matter of justice, depends essentially on the character and distribution of prefer-
 ences within the political community." Capital punishment, anti-discrimination
 laws, and other matters of principle, in contrast to those of policy, are Dworkin's
 examples of choice-insensitive issues.
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